

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

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## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of July 31

Press release 438 dated July 31

*Secretary Dulles: Any questions?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think could be accomplished at a summit conference on the Middle East problem?*

A. I believe that a meeting held under proper auspices would, on the one hand, dispel the false allegations that there is aggression being carried on by the United States or by the United Kingdom in the Middle East. It would, on the other hand, I think, show the danger there of indirect aggression which has so often been condemned by the United Nations. Thereby it might tend to stabilize the political situation, which in turn would make it easier to develop economic programs for the benefit of the people.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us when the United States answer is going forward?*

A. Probably it will be delivered in Moscow tomorrow morning. It is being released here tomorrow morning.<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Can you tell us, sir, as to whether the United States preferred to have the meeting in New York or Geneva or somewhere else?*

A. We have no strong preference as between New York and certain European places. We would not be willing to have the meeting in Moscow, having in mind the recent outrageous demonstrations occurring in Moscow where great mobs attacked and defaced the American Embassy, broke windows, etc. In the light of that we would not go to Moscow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have often said a summit conference would not have much chance without adequate preparation or some pros-*

*pect of success. Now we are about to go into a summit conference. Can you tell us what changed your view about a summit conference?*

A. The word "summit conference" is a colloquialism which can mean many different things. Now the summit conference that we have been talking about up until recently has been a conference along the lines that were discussed by Chairman Bulganin and President Eisenhower at the beginning of last December.<sup>2</sup> That was a conference which, as it was agreed on by both sides, would be designed to settle certain problems relating to disarmament perhaps and things of that sort which lent themselves to a decision at this time, and to have a conversation about other matters which greatly affected the political situation in the world.

That kind of conference we thought ought not to be held until it is well prepared, so that we know what we are going to talk about and know that we are going to talk about some matters which lend themselves to solution at this time.

Now another situation has arisen where there has been made a charge of armed aggression and alleged threat to the peace of the world. That is a different exercise entirely. That is a kind of thing which under the charter of the U.N. we agreed should be brought promptly and urgently to the consideration of the Security Council. That is a totally different matter from the kind of a conference which has been under discussion now for 7 months and which obviously is not the kind of conference that would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations.

*Q. Are you suggesting then that this would be a conference of a kind of charge and counter-charge and no more than that?*

<sup>1</sup> See p. 274.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

A. It would be a conference which would, as I said before, dispel the fiction that there is armed aggression going on by the United States or by the United Kingdom and which would, I hope, take steps so that through the United Nations or some international machinery there can be eliminated the indirect aggression which was the cause of the United States and the United Kingdom going in.

#### **The Two Issues**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our intention that this summit conference at the United Nations be strictly limited to so-called charges of aggression and indirect aggression and not deal with large substantive problems of the whole area?*

A. I would certainly not think it feasible, at a conference of this sort, to deal in a definitive way with the large problems of the area because I feel a program dealing with problems of the area would require a considerable amount of preparation. I do believe that, by dealing with these two specific problems I mention, you lay the foundation for dealing with the broader problems. These should and could be dealt with in a deliberate way. That would require more preparation. But, without disposing of these two issues promptly and effectively, we do not have an environment or a condition which permits you to proceed usefully with these other problems.

*Q. Does that mean, sir, that you rule out the consideration at this meeting of any such matters as an East-West guaranty of the borders of the Arab states and Israel against outside aggression?*

A. I would not think that, within the time available for a Security Council meeting attended by heads of governments, it would be possible to develop to a definitive conclusion anything of that sort. There are ideas that might be agreed upon there, dealing with the stability of the area, which then might be developed later on under other conditions and in a more orderly way.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, presumably the Western governments do not believe that there is aggression in the Middle East as the hostile regime charges, but how do you propose to dispel this allegation, as you say, at a summit meeting, and*

*how do you propose to demonstrate the indirect aggression at a summit meeting in a way that you haven't already done so by statements and accusations? I don't quite see what simply the gathering of persons at a summit meeting, unless they are going to do something definitive as you indicate on the broader field—what that will do that has not already been done by various governments?*

A. So far as I am aware, there has been no consideration with the Soviet Union, for example, of the problem of indirect aggression in the area. There have been charges of indirect aggression, surely, but there has been no discussion of the problem. I see no reason why, out of a discussion of the problem, there could not emerge a solution which would tend to stabilize the political situation and, incidentally, make it possible to withdraw United States and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan.

*Q. This is a naive question and you will pardon it, but how do you carry this kind of conversation to Mr. Khrushchev? You sit down—the West sits down with him and says that demonstrably there is no aggression on our part but there is indirect aggression on your part. Is this discussed back and forth? What comes out of this?*

A. What we hope comes out of it is action by the United Nations to help establish conditions of greater political stability there. Now the United Nations has time after time—notably in 1949 and 1950 resolutions—condemned the fomenting of civil strife from without. But it has never done anything to implement those resolutions. I can conceive of several things that could be done to implement those resolutions if it were agreed that it would be a good thing to stop indirect aggression in that area. That is the first thing you need to know. There is no use getting into the details of economic projects and the like if the governments there are going to live under a constant threat of indirect aggression, assassination, and the like.

Now that first basic decision could perhaps be taken—I hope it could be taken. And out of that could spring many other things which could not be finally resolved at this kind of a meeting. But the procedures for working those things out could then be established. But this is the condition precedent to getting these other things under way.

### **Lebanese Election**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will the election of a President in Lebanon facilitate the withdrawal of our forces?*

A. I can't answer that question categorically. I may say that I am very glad, indeed, that there has been an orderly election. It at least does away with one of the allegations made: that we were there in order to help assure that President Chamoun would have a second term, which is not now authorized by the constitution.

It shows the complete falseness of that charge, and I think it is well that that should have been exposed at this time. And we are very glad, indeed, that the election took place. Now whether or not that of itself will have a bearing upon the withdrawal of forces I can't say. That depends upon what the attitude of the new Government may be. It depends upon what the United Nations may do. There are a great many things that will bear upon when we withdraw.

### **The Brazilian Suggestion**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Brazil has asked<sup>3</sup> for a larger share, a larger participation, by the Latin American countries in major Western policy decision and in such meetings as the summit meeting that is being prepared now. You are going to Brazil on Sunday, and I wonder if you would tell us your impression of the Brazilian suggestion?*

A. The Brazilian position I think is very well taken: that there should be an opportunity for the small nation, for the nations of different areas, to participate in the discussion of matters which, allegedly at least, involve vital issues of war and peace. That has been the basic position of the United States for a long, long time. I recall that I myself had a considerable part in some of the discussions that took place before the United Nations was created. Then there were two concepts. One was the Soviet concept, which Stalin expressed at Yalta when he said that he was willing to join with the United States and with the United Kingdom to protect the small powers, but he never would agree that the small powers have any voice in the making of our decisions. Well, that point of view was reflected by the Soviet

Union at Dumbarton Oaks, when I was down here conferring with Secretary Hull, and again at the San Francisco conference of '45, where Senator Vandenberg and I joined in the battle to have a broader representation, geographically and in terms of small nations, in dealing with great issues of war and peace which might come before the world. Of course, in this case there is the Latin American representation on the Security Council. That is one reason why we believe that this should go before the Security Council, if the issue is going to be whether or not there exists a threat to world peace. If there is a threat to world peace, then there ought to be a broad participation through the Security Council. The Security Council is the body which, under the charter, all the members agreed would represent each of them in the discussion of these problems. And through the participation of Colombia and Panama on the Security Council there will be an opportunity for the Latin American countries to have a voice. Of course, when I am in Brazil, I expect to have a further opportunity to discuss these problems directly with President Kubitschek and the Foreign Minister.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the French Government has announced that it favors a summit conference in Geneva August 18. Premier Macmillan has said he would favor one within the United Nations on the 12th. Could you tell us what our view is as to the time of any such meeting?*

A. I think that we would be agreeable to a meeting on the 12th or any date about that time. I think the 12th would be the earliest, and it may be that even that is a little early from the standpoint of making the practical preparations which are necessary. But the date of August 12 is acceptable to us.

### **Type of Meeting Contemplated**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point, we have said that we would like to have any such meeting within the framework of the Security Council. Could you tell us specifically, sir, whether this means that we reserve the right to introduce resolutions, have votes, and, if necessary, to use the veto in considering any Soviet charge of aggression?*

A. Well, we have never yet used the veto, and I hope we never shall have to use the veto on any

<sup>3</sup> See p. 281.

such issue. Now I don't myself think that a meeting of the type that is contemplated is going to be served by the introduction of controversial resolutions and voting upon them. But the United States cannot prevent any member of the Council that wants to from introducing a resolution and calling for a vote on it. Therefore we cannot preclude that development. But we don't ourselves seek this kind of a meeting for the purpose of merely registering votes.

We have already registered votes. The Soviet Union brought a resolution of condemnation. That failed, with only one vote in its favor—the vote of the Soviet Union. There have been also resolutions to strengthen the United Nations forces and representation in Lebanon, so that the United States forces could get out. That resolution was defeated by only one vote—the veto vote of the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

Now I don't think there is any point in going through that process again. I think, if there is such a meeting, we should try to deal constructively with the problems that I have mentioned and bring about a recognition of the fact that there is a great danger from the political instability which now reigns from the use of the means of indirect aggression. I think that, unless there is some check to those processes, unless ways are found to discourage them, indeed there may be a very real threat to the peace.

President Eisenhower in one of his letters<sup>5</sup> pointed out that there was a succession of events of aggression, direct and indirect, against small nations, which led up to World War II. He also recalled, and I have recalled here previously, I think, the fact that at that time the Soviet Union urged what it called the "nonaggressive" countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, to intervene to stop this indirect aggression, and pointed out that otherwise, unless it were checked, it would inevitably lead into World War II, as indeed it did.

Now we may be faced with a situation of that kind. And I would hope very much that, if President Eisenhower talked along those terms to Mr. Khrushchev, there could perhaps out of that talk come a realization of the fact that there is a potential danger to the peace out of practices that are now being followed and that all of us who

want peace should try earnestly to find the ways to assure that methods of that sort are abandoned, or at least they become the exception and not, as they now seem to be, the rule.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do we stand then on Mr. Hammarskjold's proposal for the creation of a subcommittee of the Security Council, which might meet privately and then report back to the full Security Council?*

A. I am frankly not aware that Mr. Hammarskjold made such a proposal. It is quite possible he did. But I don't think that you need to formalize the situation by creating subcommittees which might be looked upon as a subterfuge of merely denying other members of the Council a voice. At meetings of this sort there are always talks that take place outside of the Council chamber. I have been to a good many international conferences in my lifetime, and I never yet have been to one where there were not talks that went on outside—not talks exclusively between just two people. Everybody talks around in little groups privately in corridors, dinners, luncheons, and so forth. Those are the things which often make a conference fruitful.

But in my opinion you do not need to formalize a procedure which might have the effect of making the members who weren't on the subcommittee in effect without any voice or any opportunity to be heard in what went on. I say that with all deference to Mr. Hammarskjold, whom I have the greatest regard for, and not knowing whether or not and just what his precise proposal was.

#### **Question of Outside Representation**

*Q. Do you see any way, sir, that India could have a representative, as both the Russians and British have suggested?*

A. Well, there could, of course, be an invitation to India to participate as a nation interested in the subject. Of course, one would have to consider whether, if you invited India under that provision of the charter, you would not have to invite so many more countries that the conference would become practically unmanageable. I remember that, when we were sitting in somewhat of an extraordinary session of the Security Council at the time of the Suez affair, where most of the governments were represented by foreign min-

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 186.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1958, p. 233.

isters, there was then a request by a great many countries to be heard on the grounds that they were interested in the operation of the Suez Canal. And indeed they were. But finally we reached a point where the numbers were such that it was clear they could not all be given an opportunity to participate personally in the discussion, and a way was found for presenting their point of view in writing. I realize that that would not be satisfactory from the standpoint of some of the countries we have in mind. But there is a very serious problem if you start going beyond the composition of the Security Council and the mandatory provision that a party to a dispute must be heard. They have a right to be heard, and I would suppose in this case that would include Lebanon and Jordan. If you go beyond that, then you get yourself involved in a whole series of perplexing difficulties.

As President Eisenhower said in one of his letters to Mr. Khrushchev,<sup>6</sup> when you start to improvise new rules, you generally don't save time but you get yourself involved in a whole series of new problems.

There are demands to participate that are pouring in from all over the world. Now you can deal with them in an orderly way at the Security Council, and I think the orderly way will have to be to hold down the outside representation because otherwise you had better adjourn into a meeting of the General Assembly.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to be saying this afternoon that you and the President do not envisage this conference as the Geneva one of '55 in dealing with general world tensions but rather as a kind of international grand jury in which we would develop our indictment of indirect aggression and would attempt to dismiss or dispel their accusation of direct aggression. Is that a fair inference? And, if it is, do you think that it is neither wise nor necessary now for us to enunciate a new program of permanent stabilization in the Middle East?*

A. Well, that is a pretty complicated question. (Laughter)

*Q. I didn't mean it to be complicated.*

A. Let me say, as far as the first half of it is concerned, I have expressed myself very badly indeed if I gave the impression that I felt that all

that would come out of this conference would be our rebuttal of Soviet charges that we were guilty of aggression in the area. I have, I hope, pointed out this: that, if the practices of indirect aggression as they are being developed at the present time are allowed to persist in the world, and if no way is found to check that, then I think the world is indeed in grave danger of war. I believe that that can be made apparent—should be made apparent. Also I believe that, if the Soviet Union does not want a war, they will almost have to agree that these practices should be brought under some kind of control by the United Nations.

Now, if that is not a constructive proposal, I don't know what could be a constructive proposal. And if that principle is accepted and if you create the conditions which will create political stability, which will not necessarily freeze the existing situation, perpetuate the status quo, but allow it to be changed by orderly methods which do not involve direct or indirect aggression, then you will have laid the foundation under which a great many additional things can grow.

Those things, I think, cannot be fully dealt with although they can be generally portrayed perhaps at such a meeting. But you cannot at such a meeting as this develop detailed economic programs, in my opinion. You can create the climate which makes them possible. You can indicate them in general terms. But the full development of that would have to be, I think, a further step.

#### **Policy Toward Arab Nationalism**

*Q. What I have in mind in the second part of the question, Mr. Secretary, if I may just get back to it—*

A. Yes.

*Q. —was whether or not you felt inside or outside a summit meeting it was timely now or would be timely in the very near future to give our policy toward Arab nationalism, for instance, and give our policy toward—or renounce it, if you prefer to put it that way—what our policy is toward a peace conference between Israel and the Arab states, leaving these precise economic programs until later?*

A. Well, I think that, if you found a receptive atmosphere on some of these basic questions, it would open the way to further solutions of such matters as you discuss. Now let me say on Arab

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.

nationalism there is no opposition that I know of on the part of the United States to Arab nationalism. There are plenty of good reasons why there should be greater unity among the Arab nations. The United States encourages that. We were among the early nations to recognize the U.A.R. when it was formed. Some of our friends held back. We did not. We knew it had some undesirable implications, but, because we did not want to be in opposition to this increased Arab unity, we granted recognition. We were prepared to grant recognition to the Arab Union, another step toward unity. There is no opposition on the part of the United States to an increased Arab unity which expresses, and gives an opportunity to, the aspirations of the Arab peoples. That is one thing. Whether or not in this area of the world or other areas of the world processes of indirect aggression become accepted as proper instruments of national policy, that is a very different thing. That does affect the peace and security of the world.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, next month, sir, we are going to have to be dealing with the Soviets in a space race to the moon and in the form of a so-called "potshot" at the moon. If we have an American achievement, if we win, what will be our proprietary rights, if any? (Laughter)*

*Q. And, if so, will we turn them over to the U.N.? (Laughter)*

A. You know, I studied my international law quite a few years ago, before it embraced these subjects. I think you will have to call on one who has gone to law school more recently than me to get the answer to that question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev has professed to be concerned at our alleged concern about security problems involved in any summit conference in New York. Do you think the security problems in New York would be such as to make it impossible or difficult to hold a summit meeting there?*

A. I do not think so. The check which we have made with the authorities in New York indicates that they do not think so.

#### **Recognition of Present Government in Iraq**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that there is a danger that the quick recognition being given*

*to the present Government in Iraq may encourage revolution and violence in Lebanon and Jordan?*

A. I do not think that that is the case, although certainly that is a legitimate question to put. This matter was discussed in London on Sunday and Monday when I was there.<sup>7</sup> It was the combined judgment of our friends there, such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, that the recognition was on the whole desirable and would not have the consequence which you indicate. Therefore we shall probably ourselves go along in that judgment.<sup>8</sup> They are closer to the scene than we are. Certainly they are more subject to that danger than we are. So, if they think that under the circumstances recognition is the wise and prudent course, we would give a great deal of weight to their judgment in the matter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider in your thinking about the summit conference that its end result would be expressed in terms of peoples' attitudes, Mr. Khrushchev's realization about indirect aggression, or, as one of your earlier remarks indicate, that the Security Council meeting with heads of government would actually set or create and set in motion some machinery to do away with indirect aggression?*

A. I would suppose that the creation of machinery could not be formalized or finalized at such a meeting as this because, when you pass from the general to the particular, you always find a great many practical problems that have to be dealt with. Probably they could not be dealt with within the compass of this meeting. But there are a number of ideas that are floating around as to action which might be taken to deal with this problem of indirect aggression. For example, one of the new instrumentalities that is extremely potent in doing what the United Nations has condemned, that is, the fomenting of civil strife from without, is the broadcasting from one country into another.

Now it has been suggested, for example, that that kind of a thing, while it can't be controlled and regulated consistently with our ideas of the freedom of the media of information, could at least be checked on by the United Nations—reported on—so that, if it seemed to reach a point

<sup>7</sup> Secretary Dulles attended a Ministerial meeting of the Baghdad Pact at London July 28-29 (see p. 272).

<sup>8</sup> For an announcement of U.S. recognition, see p. 273.

where it constituted aggression, a report to that effect could be made. I just throw that out as one sample of what might be done.

Now, to work out the details of that would require more study than could be given at this time. But if in principle it were felt that this was a dangerous process, this indirect aggression, and there was a genuine realization of the danger to all of us that could flow from it, I believe that that change of attitude, as you put it, would then permit some of these things to be worked out. But the technical workout would probably have to come later.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a reluctance by General de Gaulle to attend the summit conference under the United Nations Security Council sponsorship. If he refuses to go under the United Nations sponsorship of the Security Council, will the summit conference be held anyway?*

A. I think that, if some of the other heads of government came, the meeting would proceed, although I know that everybody would be very regretful if General de Gaulle felt that he could not personally be there. I am sure that France would be very adequately represented, but, of course, we would all hope that General de Gaulle could be there.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything in this contemplated summit meeting that would prevent the Russians from coming there with the broad comprehensive plan for the Middle East on several broad economic, political, and so on plans, and, if they should do that, how would we meet it?*

A. I suppose there is nothing in the world that would prevent the Soviet Union or anybody else from outlining a broad picture of what might happen in the area in the way of economic development. I have great reservations as to whether this particular meeting could deal with these things except in a general way. Certainly it is our position, the United States position, that constructive economic developments really have to be dependent upon a greater measure of political stability and political security than exists at the present time. When the principal personalities in a government are living in daily fear of murder and assassination, it's very hard to get their

minds onto a problem of economic development for the next 20 years. They are more interested in the next 20 minutes.

#### **Conditions for Withdrawal of Troops**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that there must be political stability in the Middle East, at least in Lebanon and Jordan, before the United States and Britain can withdraw their troops, and in order to obtain that stability there must be some indication by the Soviet Union to stop what you term indirect aggression?*

A. I don't like to adopt precisely those words because there are certain other matters which I know you would recognize were relevant. For example, whatever our views may be, we would not stay in Lebanon after we had been asked to withdraw by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon. We might not think it was wise to withdraw, but we would withdraw under those conditions. By and large, we would think that there ought to be a greater measure of political stability when we come out than was the case when we went in. That would be our hope.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in documenting your thesis of indirect aggression, how far back do you intend to go, and what areas do you intend to cover?*

A. The particular area that is being dealt with here is the area of the Middle East. But I would suppose that any procedures that were adopted would have general applicability. The resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, for instance, the "Peace Through Deeds" resolution of 1950,<sup>9</sup> which condemned the fomenting of civil strife from without as among the worst of all international crimes—that didn't say the fomenting of civil strife in the Middle East was the worst of all crimes. It was general in its character. And, while the particular matter which brings this thing to a head at the moment is in the Middle East, the problem is more general. You may remember that before the Second World War there was aggression against small countries, some of it indirect aggression, going on in the Far East. You also had it going on in Europe. You also had it going on in Africa.

Well, at the moment, the tension is focused on the situation in the Middle East. But the disease

<sup>9</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1950, p. 767.

you're trying to deal with has the potentiality of having evil effects almost anywhere in the world. I think any solution that is sought and found ought to be of general applicability.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I had understood that the principal requirement for a decision to withdraw United States troops from Lebanon was a satisfactory action by the United Nations to secure the integrity and independence of the country. Now you did not state that qualification when you said, "We would withdraw if asked by a duly constituted Government of Lebanon to do so." Is this another basis for withdrawal?*

A. Well, it has always been inherent in our position in Lebanon that we were there at the invitation of the duly constituted Government of Lebanon and that we would not stay after a duly constituted Government of Lebanon asked us to come out. Now I put that on as an appendage to the question I had been asked, which was whether in general we did not want our withdrawal to be coincident with the establishment of better conditions of international stability through the United Nations processes or otherwise.

Now the action which the Secretary-General is taking along the lines of the Japanese resolution<sup>10</sup> tends to be another measure which the United Nations can take. And the precedent set there might also have general applicability.

I gave one illustration of what might be done. A good many people think there ought to be a standing group of the United Nations which could go to any place which felt itself endangered by this type of indirect aggression and throw a kind of mantle of security around it. If that were done in Lebanon, perhaps in Jordan, that would perhaps establish a precedent.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, since the Kremlin has been intent for a long time on trying to split the Western allies, has it been disturbing to us that Mr. de Gaulle seemed to prefer Khrushchev's proposal for a summit meeting to our own?*

A. I do not think that that difference touches in any way upon the fundamentals of our relationship or upon our alliance. Naturally, we would like it if we all agreed. But I have often times pointed out that one quality which the free

nations have and must have is diversity. And diversity, if shown within reasonable limits, would not break the free world apart. This will not break it apart.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any prospect in this matter of indirect aggression of getting back into that debate that has been going on in the United Nations for several sessions now on writing into the charter or by resolution a definition of aggression?*

A. I do not think that that is desirable. I remember that it was discussed at San Francisco in '45. I can remember very well Mr. Anthony Eden, who was there at that time, saying he was opposed to any definition of aggression because, when you tried to define what aggression is, then somebody can almost always find a way around it.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## **Ministerial Meeting of Baghdad Pact**

*Following is the text of a declaration issued at London on July 28 by the nations attending the Ministerial meeting of the Baghdad Pact, together with the text of a final communique issued on July 29 at the close of the meeting.*

### **TEXT OF DECLARATION**

Press release 431 dated July 29

1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London have re-examined their position in the light of recent events and conclude that the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever. These members declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

2. Under the Pact collective security arrangements have been instituted. Joint military planning has been advanced and area economic projects have been promoted. Relationships are being established with other free world nations associated for collective security.

3. The question of whether substantive alterations should be made in the Pact and its organization or whether the Pact will be continued in its

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 199.

present form is under consideration by the Governments concerned. However, the nations represented at the meeting in London reaffirmed their determination to strengthen further their united defence posture in the area.

4. Article I of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955<sup>1</sup> provides that the parties will co-operate for their security and defence and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States, in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorisation, agrees to co-operate with the nations making this Declaration for their security and defence, and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation.

MANOUCHEHR EGHBAL  
*Prime Minister of Iran*

MALIK FIROZ KHAN NOON  
*Prime Minister of Pakistan*

ADNAN MENDERES  
*Prime Minister of Turkey*

HAROLD MACMILLAN  
*Prime Minister of the United Kingdom*

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
*Secretary of State, United States of America*

A significant Declaration was signed on July 28. The member governments represented welcomed the new initiative of the United States as set out in paragraph 4 of the Declaration, whereby the United States agreed to cooperate with the other nations making the Declaration for their security and defence.

The Ministers exchanged views on the world situation with particular reference to the Middle East. They expressed their concern at the recent examples of aggression by indirect means. This represents a spreading and dangerous threat to the independence and territorial integrity of sovereign states and should be combatted by all possible legitimate means including action by the United Nations. In this connection, the Ministers appreciated the recent prompt action taken in accordance with the principles of international law and in conformity with the United Nations Charter, by the United Kingdom and the United States of America in responding to the call for help of the lawful governments of Lebanon and Jordan.

The Ministers agreed to maintain the close contact existing between their Governments in order to achieve the aims and purposes of their association for mutual cooperation and to strengthen their ability to resist direct or indirect aggression.

#### TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

The Baghdad Pact Council met, as previously scheduled, in London on July 28 and July 29. The delegations from member countries present were led by:

- (i) His Excellency Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, Prime Minister, Iran.
- (ii) His Excellency Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Prime Minister, Pakistan.
- (iii) His Excellency Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister, Turkey.
- (iv) The Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister, United Kingdom.

The United States delegation was led by Secretary of State, the Honourable John Foster Dulles.

Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, was in the chair.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

#### U.S. Recognizes Government of Republic of Iraq

Press release 440 dated August 2

The U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad on August 2 delivered a note<sup>1</sup> to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq taking note of the assurances transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations that Iraq declares itself bound by the United Nations Charter and its other international obligations. In the note the U.S. Government accepted these assurances and extended recognition to the Government of the Republic of Iraq with the expression of its good wishes. Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman continues in his post as Ambassador to Iraq.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

## **President Suggests August 12 as Date for Special Session of Security Council on Middle East Problem**

*Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>1</sup>*

### **THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV**

White House press release dated August 1

AUGUST 1, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: For several centuries personal correspondence between Heads of Government and Heads of State has been an extremely valuable channel of communication when the normal diplomatic channels seemed unable to carry the full burden. However, it has always been recognized—not just as a matter of diplomatic form but as a requirement of efficacy—that the essential ingredient in such correspondence, whether confidential or public, was a tone of serious purpose and an absence of invective.

It is in this tradition that I reply to your letter of July 28.

I consider it quite inaccurate for you, both implicitly and explicitly, to convey the impression that the Government of the United States has embarked on a policy of delay based on niggling procedural argument. The fact is that the differences between us are not procedural but basic.

Very simply, the two basic points which the United States has stated many times in the past, and which I repeat now, are (a) do all of us, the Charter Members of the United Nations, agree that the United Nations Security Council has the principal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; and (b) shall

small nations as well as a few so-called "great powers" have a part in the making of decisions which inevitably involve them?

As to my first point—What of the United Nations? It was created out of the travail of World War II to establish a world of order and of justice. It embodied and still embodies the hopes of mankind. At this juncture, when you claim peace is endangered, you would push it aside—we would invoke its processes.

This leads to my second point—What of the smaller powers of this world? Shall they be ignored or shall the small nations be represented in the making of decisions which inevitably involve them? History has certainly given us ample proof that a nation's capacity to contribute to the advancement of mankind is not to be measured by the number of divisions it can put in the field. You must be aware, as I am, of the many very specific proposals made these last years by the so-called smaller powers which have been of great value to all of us.

The stated assumption in your letter that the decisions of five great powers will be happily accepted by all other interested powers seems to indicate an attitude on your part which could have dangerous consequences in the future for the smaller powers of this world.

Your position, which means that the desires, the dignity, in fact the security, of the smaller nations should be disregarded, is one which the United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose today. Essentially you are proposing that we should join you in a policy reminiscent of the system of political domination you imposed in Eastern Europe. The United States cannot accept that point of view.

The problem of the Middle East is not one of a threat of aggression by the United States but

<sup>1</sup> For the July 19 and 22 and July 23 and 25 exchanges of letters, see BULLETIN of Aug. 11, 1958, p. 229.

rather the threat, by others, of further indirect aggression against independent states. This problem is clearly the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council.

I am, therefore, instructing the United States Permanent Representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting on or about August 12 of the Security Council under Article 28 (2), which would permit direct discussions among Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers. I would hope that you would similarly instruct your Permanent Representative. Such a meeting will make it possible for the Council to discharge its responsibilities in the manner contemplated by the Charter.

As for the place of the meeting, the United States agrees that the meeting might be held elsewhere than New York City but we could not agree to the meeting being held in Moscow. The memory of the well-organized mass demonstration and serious damage to the United States Embassy in Moscow is too fresh in the minds of the American people.

If such a meeting is arranged, I expect to attend and participate and I hope that you would do likewise.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### **PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT**

Unofficial translation

MR. PRESIDENT: I received your communication of July 25 which is an answer to my communication of July 23 regarding the convocation of a conference of Heads of Government.

Regrettably, I am obliged to state that in this reply the Government of the USA diverges from its position taken on July 22 about an urgent convocation of a special meeting of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government for examining the situation in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Now it is clear that the Government of the USA is carrying on matters to delay the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government and does not want that this conference should take urgent measures for the peaceful solution of the military conflict that has arisen in the region of the Near and Middle East.

It cannot but be noted that your agreement to the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council, which you mentioned in your communication of July 22, was positively interpreted in all countries. The agreement of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France

and India regarding the meeting of the Heads of Government brought some reassurance, and the peoples with full justification expected that this conference would take place as soon as possible and would guarantee the preservation and strengthening of peace in the Near and Middle East. The Soviet Government expressed its agreement with this proposal of Mr. Macmillan, inasmuch as the Prime Minister of Great Britain, proposing to carry out a conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council, stated explicitly that in the course of this conference it was not desirable to introduce any resolutions if they do not originate from previous agreement and that the objective of our joint work would be to achieve fruitful agreement and not the fixation of disagreements by means of voting.

Your current reply represents a step backwards from the achieved agreement and, naturally, cannot but evoke serious anxiety among the peoples. The Government of the USA proposes that instead of the examination by the Heads of Government of the five powers of the situation dangerous for peace in the Near and Middle East, this question should again be transferred to a regular session of the Security Council of the UN. This proposal is now also supported by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan. But what can this bring? You, of course, know well that the Security Council, as the experience of its last sessions showed, is not capable in its regular meetings to adopt an urgent and effective solution for this question. In this region an unceasing accumulation of armed forces is taking place and it more and more is becoming a powder-magazine which can explode from the smallest spark and evoke a world catastrophe.

In these circumstances it is necessary in the quickest manner for the Heads of Government of the five powers—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India—to meet, with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, who being invested with high authority could reach an agreement about the quick termination of the military conflict in the region of the Near and Middle East and about measures for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

It is entirely evident that if we with complete sincerity desire to find a way for reducing tension then we must agree that in the present instance these five powers must first reach agreement on the necessary measures for preserving and strengthening peace. Can anyone doubt that, if these powers succeed in reaching agreement about the immediate termination of the armed conflict in the Near and Middle East, any other state which is actually interested in strengthening peace would welcome and support such a solution (sic).

The proposal of Mr. Macmillan on July 22 about holding a conference of the Heads of Government within the framework of the Security Council envisaged a meeting of the Heads of Government of such a character. But, as I have already noted, at the present time you, Mr. President, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain diverge from this proposal. One cannot but see that in this manner a course is being taken in order to bury the

agreement already achieved about the most rapid meeting of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India.

We cannot accept this.

The Soviet Government firmly stands on the position of struggling for the preservation and strengthening of peace, on the position of the peaceful co-existence of states irrespective of their social-economic systems. The Soviet Government consistently comes out for the solution of conflicts by peaceful means through negotiations. Therefore we insist upon the immediate thwarting of aggression, upon the immediate withdrawal of troops of the interventionists from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan.

According to our deep conviction a meeting of the Heads of Government of the five powers, with the existence on all sides of sincere striving for this, would assist in finding a way and possibilities for liquidating the armed conflict and for introducing reassurance in the region of the Near and Middle East.

In this connection the Soviet Government expresses its satisfaction with the view expressed by the Head of Government of France, Mr. de Gaulle, in his communication of July 26 that he supports the proposal of the convocation without delay of a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, which, as we understand, does not diverge from the proposal of the Soviet Government on this question. We consider, as we announced earlier, that this would be the most correct course which could guarantee a rapid achievement of a solution of the urgent problem of terminating the military conflict in the Near and Middle East.

To delay further the convocation of the conference of the Heads of Government, a reference is made in your communication to the fact that supposedly a misunderstanding took place of the formulation about the meeting of the Heads of Government made by the Government of the USA. In this case one cannot but ask whether this formulation was specially proposed in such a form in order that it give grounds for differing interpretations and lead to the loss of time in correspondence for making more precise its meaning. Inasmuch as you in your communication of July 22 expressed agreement for participating in a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the Heads of Government, we in the resulting conditions could not but understand this as your agreement for the quickest convocation of such a session. Now you, diverging from the quickest convocation of the session, recommend to take up again the reading of your letter of July 22. Is it possible to understand these words of yours any differently than as a testimony of the fact that the Government of the USA clearly does not want measures to be taken for thwarting the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in the quickest manner (sic)?

I will not disguise, Mr. President, that the line of the Governments of the USA and Great Britain in fact for rejecting a conference of the Heads of Government cannot but evoke anxiety among the peoples, who with impatience await for the armed conflict in the Near and

Middle East to be put to an end and for measures to be adopted for preserving and strengthening universal peace.

In all countries representatives of the public with anxiety ask the question—do not the Governments of the states, who are responsible for the current tense situation in the Near and Middle East, want to blunt the vigilance of the peoples and on the sly to prepare for new acts of aggression. Of course, for the Government of the USA it is better known than to anyone else that American forces continue to debark in Lebanon where, with the support and cover of American bayonets, the Special Emissary of the State Department Murphy has undertaken suspicious activity and who unceremoniously interferes in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The concentration of American Naval Forces is taking place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, American reinforcements are being sent by air from Europe to the Near and Middle East, and especially, to Turkey in the area of Adana. In this connection the extensive preparation for armed interference in the affairs of the Arab East, which has taken place recently in Turkey itself, attracts special attention. King Hussein of Jordan, who has lost the support of his people and depends on the assistance of the interventionists, dares to rattle sabers and to threaten a march on Baghdad. He appears as an obedient tool in the hands of known Western powers which have plotted against the peoples of the Arab East. A clear tendency to expand the region of aggression is noted. The threat of an armed attack hangs over the Iraq Republic.

Thus a delay in the negotiations about a meeting of the Heads of Government of the five powers, which is accompanied by an ever larger accumulation of armed forces in the Near and Middle East, leads to a further sharpening of the situation, to a broadening of the conflict, and can lead humanity to a catastrophe.

Now, as never before, rapid and energetic action is necessary which would guarantee the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan and would make the widening of the area of military conflict in the Near and Middle East impossible. There is no time to be lost.

It is impossible, however, not to mention that instead of facilitating the urgent convening of a conference of the Heads of Government with the aim of immediately putting an end to the armed conflict in the region of the Middle and Near East, the Government of the USA is sending its Secretary of State to London to a meeting of the members of the Baghdad Pact. Hasty attempts are being made somehow to patch up this Pact, the withdrawal from which by the only Arab country, Iraq, is evidence again of the failure of the policy conducted "from a position of strength" by the Western states, a policy of knocking together aggressive blocs. At the same time the Government of the USA seeks in every way possible to hamper the solution of what is now the main problem, and of that for which all humanity is now waiting, the question of the ending of the armed intervention of the USA and Great Britain in the Near and Middle East; it seeks to lead the discussions about the meeting of the Heads of Government into a labyrinth of endless discussions about the form and procedure of this meeting.

A conference in London of the representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, the USA, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran looks like a plot against the Arab countries under conditions when, instead of the withdrawal at full speed of the foreign forces from Lebanon and Jordan, the preparation for armed intervention in the affairs of the Iraq Republic goes forward. Isn't all this being done in order to arrange for new acts of aggression and by means of conducting a policy of *faits accomplis* to face the world with an ever larger and larger widening of the military conflict? But it is impossible not to consider the serious consequences of such a policy, particularly for its initiators, insofar as peoples in our time are sufficiently vigilant and cannot reconcile themselves with acts of aggression.

The Government of the USA is doing everything in order to frustrate a meeting of the Heads of Government of the five powers, which ought to put an end to the armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan and take timely measures for the maintenance and strengthening of universal peace.

Consequently, you are not on the road toward a solution of the military conflict, which has begun in the Near and Middle East, in the interests of the maintenance and strengthening of peace, but you are conducting the affair toward a widening of the area of military conflict and you are placing before humanity the threat of a world catastrophe. Thereby you, in the first instance, assume the heavy responsibility before humanity and history for the consequences of such a policy of the Government of the USA. A heavy responsibility also lies on the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, who, although he tries to equivocate, conducts essentially the same policy, aimed at the frustration of the adoption of any measures for the liquidation of the military conflict in Jordan and Lebanon.

In view of the extraordinarily tense situation created in the region of the Near and Middle East, the Soviet Government considers essential, as before, the immediate convening of a conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and India with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN.

As to the place for the conduct of this conference, we directed attention to the statement of the Head of the Government of France, Mr. de Gaulle, in his message of July 26, that he prefers that this meeting take place in Europe. The Soviet Government has already previously expressed itself in favor of having the meeting take place in Europe, and supports the proposal of Mr. de Gaulle. It is all the more necessary to consider the question of conducting the conference in one of the cities of Europe since voices are heard among the diplomats of the USA and in the American press that the American authorities will meet with difficulties in the matter of guaranteeing the

security of the Heads of Government if the conference is called in the USA. We did not want to place the Government of the USA in an embarrassing position on this question. Therefore, not objecting to the convening of a conference in New York as before, the Soviet Government agrees to a meeting in Geneva, Vienna, Paris, or in any other place acceptable to all the participants. We would also welcome the reaching of agreement about the meeting of the Heads of Government in Moscow whereby the Soviet Government guarantees for the delegation full security and necessary conditions for fruitful work. We are convinced that the Soviet people would welcome envoys who would arrive in order to adopt urgent measures for terminating the conflict in the Near and Middle East and for strengthening universal peace, and the Soviet people would demonstrate their inflexible devotion to the matter of peace.

In your communication the question is avoided about the participation of the Prime Minister of India in the conference of the Heads of Government. In connection with this I consider it necessary to underscore again that the participation of India in the mentioned conference would have great significance for achieving constructive solutions for settling the situation in the Near and Middle East.

As to the date for holding a conference of the Heads of Government with the participation of the Secretary-General of the UN, we named the date July 28. Inasmuch as you stated that this date is too early for the Government of the USA, we are ready for another early date and would want to receive a clear reply to this question about when the USA would be ready to participate in a conference of the Heads of Government of the five powers. I would want to receive from you, Mr. President, as rapid a reply to my communication as possible.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

July 28, 1958

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

*President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D. C.*

## Letters of Credence

### Paraguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of Paraguay, Juan Plate, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on July 29. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 430.

## **U.S. Acknowledges Soviet Acceptance of President's Proposal To Hold Technical Talks on Safeguards Against Surprise Attack**

*Following is the text of a note delivered on July 31 by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the prevention of surprise attack, together with the text of a letter of July 2 to President Eisenhower from Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.*

### **U.S. NOTE**

Press release 436 dated July 31

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the letters of May 9, 1958<sup>1</sup> and July 2, 1958 from Prime Minister Khrushchev to President Eisenhower with regard to the problem of preventing surprise attack. The Prime Minister's letters commented upon the proposals of the United States on this subject and advanced certain additional proposals of the Soviet Government. The Government of the United States would like now to reply to these letters insofar as they relate to this important question.

As President Eisenhower pointed out in his letter of April 28, 1958,<sup>2</sup> the United States is determined that the Soviet Union and the United States ultimately reach an agreement on disarmament. As an effective means of moving toward ultimate agreement, he proposed that technical experts start to work immediately upon the practical problems involved. In this connection, he raised the question whether both sides would not be in a better position to reach agreements if there were a common accepted understanding as to methods of inspecting against surprise attack. It

is noted that Prime Minister Khrushchev now suggests that appropriate representatives—including those of the military agencies of both sides, e. g., at the level of experts—designated by the Soviet Union, the United States and possibly by the governments of certain other states meet for a joint study of the practical aspects of this problem. Accordingly, the United States proposes that qualified persons from each side meet for a study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. They should concentrate on the means and objects of control, and on the results which could be secured from these safeguards. The discussions could bear, if necessary, on the applicability of inspection measures to various areas for illustrative purposes only, but without prejudging in any way the boundaries within which such measures should be applied. It will be recalled that the United States has always favored the broadest possible application of such measures, and that in fact in President Eisenhower's initial proposal in 1955 he suggested that the entire territories of the United States and the Soviet Union be open to inspection. The United States assumes, on the basis of Prime Minister Khrushchev's letter of July 2, 1958 that the Soviet Government agrees that these discussions would take place without prejudice to the respective positions of the two Governments as to the delimitation of areas within which safeguards would be established, or as to the timing or interdependence of various aspects of disarmament. The United States does not agree that the particular areas to be supervised as against surprise attack should be those indicated by Prime Minister Khrushchev's letter of July 2, 1958.

In this connection, the Government of the United States must indicate disagreement with Prime Minister Khrushchev's statement that the

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 940.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 811.

proposals relating to zones of inspection against surprise attack put forward by the United States, United Kingdom, and France on May 28, 1958<sup>3</sup> fail to strike a balance between the interests of both sides. It is the zones of inspection proposed by the Soviet Government which are subject to this criticism. This is particularly true of the European zone proposal which covers only a very limited area, scarcely touching Russian territory and far too small to cover the areas from which a surprise attack would be launched under modern conditions. Moreover, this proposal seems to be motivated by the political desire to crystallize the present dividing line in Europe since it is calculated from the "line of demarcation" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The United States believes, however, that joint technical studies would make it easier to reach agreement later at a political level on the definition of the regions in which the safeguards would apply. Accordingly, the United States proposes that during the first week of October, which is the earliest date by which preparations adequate to the significance and complexity of the task can be completed, these discussions begin in Geneva. In view of the Charter responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the United States would propose to keep the United Nations informed of the progress of the talks through the Secretary General. Further arrangements for the meeting can be concluded through diplomatic channels.

In his letter of May 9, 1958 in particular, and again on July 2, 1958, Prime Minister Khrushchev also referred to the question of United States military flights especially in the Arctic area.

The United States regrets that unfounded charges continue regarding United States flights in the Arctic area and that the Soviet Union continues to reject United States proposals for a timely international inspection system in this area which would serve the end which the Soviet Union proposes, namely "to prevent this area from becoming a hot bed of military conflict between our countries."

It is stated that the proposal of the United States for inspection in this area, a proposal which commanded general support not only in the

United Nations Security Council<sup>4</sup> but throughout the world, is no solution because the United States did not promise to suspend atomic bomber flights in the direction of the Soviet Union if an Arctic zone were established.

With respect to that statement, the United States desires to correct the apparent misunderstanding concerning atomic bomber operations of the United States. The greater portion of the Arctic zone air space is internationally free. There is considerable military aviation activity in that area, participated in by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations of the world. The statements of the Soviet representative in the United Nations Security Council, however, indicate concern that in this or other areas military aircraft of the United States armed with hydrogen and atomic bombs may have been sent in the direction of the borders of the Soviet Union as a result of a misinterpreted radar blip or other false alert. The Government of the United States gives categorical assurances that the United States has never had the need to launch nor has it in fact ever launched any atomic bomber flights of this type. Furthermore, if dependable and adequate safeguards were to be provided against surprise attack, then, of course, any United States flights entering, leaving or operating within an Arctic zone would conform to agreed control measures.

The United States believes that technical discussions of measures to reduce the possibility of surprise attack, even though made without reference to particular areas, will produce a fuller realization of the value of an Arctic zone, and pave the way for agreement on safeguards in this and other regions. Such technical discussions would also be helpful in determining whether a meeting of heads of government would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.

#### **PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT**

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am addressing this letter to you in order to make a proposal for joint steps toward solving the problem of preventing surprise attack.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, July 7, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

The tension in present international relations and the continuing acceleration of the tempo of armament by states, especially in the production of ever more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction, makes it necessary, in our opinion, to reach agreement on the adoption of measures for preventing the possibility of surprise attack by one state against another, along with initial measures for restricting the armaments race such as, for example, the universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Government, attaching great significance to this matter, proposed, as you know, that it be included in the agenda for the meeting of heads of government.

I must say that recently the problem of preventing surprise attack has become especially acute in view of the fact that the United States of America has introduced the dangerous practice of flights by American military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of a number of West European states and in Arctic areas in the direction of the USSR borders.

The Soviet Government has already expressed its opinion repeatedly concerning such acts on the part of the United States Air Force. To what has been said only one thing may be added: on the day when the American Government issues the order to cease flights of this kind, the danger of atomic war, which threatens mankind, will be greatly reduced.

From your messages addressed to the Soviet Government, we know that the Government of the USA agrees that at a summit conference it is necessary to discuss the question of eliminating the danger of surprise attack. This is gratifying to us, since agreement by both sides on the desirability of considering such an important question is in itself a great achievement.

However, there is still another side to the question which must not be forgotten. Settlement of the problem of the prevention of surprise attack is possible, of course, only if the interests of all parties are taken into account in an equitable manner, wherein no single state will be placed in an unequal position from the standpoint of ensuring the interests of its security.

The Government of the USA is familiar with the proposals of the Soviet Government regarding specific measures for preventing the possibility of surprise attack. The Soviet Union proposes that agreement be reached concerning the establishment of control posts at railway centers, large ports, and major highways, in combination with specific disarmament measures, and concerning aerial photography in areas that are of great significance from the standpoint of preventing the danger of surprise attack. In particular, we are prepared to reach agreement on reciprocal aerial photography in the zone of concentration of the main armed forces of the two groupings of states in Europe to a depth of 800 kilometers east and west of the line of demarcation between those forces. The Soviet Government also proposes, in addition to the zone in Europe, the establishment of a zone of aerial inspection which would include a portion of Soviet territory in the Far East and a corresponding portion of the territory of the USA.

The said proposals are based on equal consideration for the security interests of the parties concerned. For example, they provide for aerial inspection over territories of equal size belonging to the USSR and the USA. These proposals have also taken into consideration those previously advanced by the Western Powers, and by the Government of the USA in particular. That is why it seems to us that these proposals might constitute a suitable basis for agreement. Unfortunately, they have not hitherto met with a positive attitude on the part of the Government of the USA.

We have studied with due attention the counterproposals advanced by the Government of the USA jointly with the United Kingdom and France. However, it must be stated that the proposals of the three Western Powers on this subject that were transmitted to the Soviet Government on May 28 of this year do not indicate a desire to seek agreement by joint effort concerning methods of preventing surprise attack. Although the document of the three Powers mentions the necessity for following a realistic course and for considering equally the legitimate interests of security of all the states concerned, the proposals contained therein concerning the prevention of surprise attack are obviously not in accord with these statements.

Thus, in the matter of preventing the possibility of surprise attack, we have so far reached agreement only in the sense that both sides recognize the importance of this task and the desirability of its consideration at a summit meeting. Yet, as far as specific methods of solving this problem are concerned, we are still far from agreement. However, it appears to me that agreement on this point is also fully possible, if only all parties would base their position on the necessity of taking into account the security interests of each of the parties to the agreement and refrain from actions that would aggravate the situation and increase the danger of war.

Mindful of the importance that agreement on joint measures for the prevention of surprise attack by one state against another would have for the preservation of universal peace, I should like to propose to you, Mr. President, that the governments of our countries show practical initiative in this important matter. In the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be useful if in the near future the appropriate representatives—including those of the military agencies of both sides, e. g., at the level of experts—designated by the Governments of the USSR, the USA, and possibly by the governments of certain other states, met for a joint study of the practical aspects of this problem and developed within a definite period of time, to be determined in advance, recommendations regarding measures for the prevention of the possibility of surprise attack. The results of these negotiations could be considered at a meeting of heads of government. Such preliminary work would undoubtedly facilitate the adoption of a decision on this question at the meeting itself.

We hope that this proposal will meet with a favorable attitude on the part of the Government of the United States and that the joint efforts of our two countries will

bring about a strengthening of trust between states, which is so necessary for ensuring peace throughout the world.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV  
Moscow, July 2, 1958

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D. C.

## U.S. and Germany Discuss Middle East Situation

*Following is the text of a joint communique issued at Bonn on July 26 at the conclusion of a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.*

Unofficial translation

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed the current political situation for several hours in Bonn this afternoon. The following persons participated in the meeting: Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, Minister William C. Trimble, William Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Gerard Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, and Loftus Becker, the Legal Advisor, Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, State Secretaries von Scherpenberg, Globke and von Eckardt, as well as Ministerial Direktor Dittmann and the German Ambassador to the United States Grewe.

A detailed exchange of views took place concerning questions connected with the Near East situation. In this context a discussion was held as to what procedure would offer the best opportunities for a solution. The talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness, characteristic of the relations between the two countries as well as between the German Federal Chancellor and the United States Secretary of State. A complete clarification was achieved of the motives and intentions which recently guided the attitudes of the two Governments. There was also full agreement on the assessment of the cur-

rent situation and the conclusions to be drawn from it.

Secretary of State Dulles is leaving Bonn tonight for London.<sup>1</sup>

## U.S. and Brazilian Presidents Support Summit Meeting at U.N.

*Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, President of the United States of Brazil.*

White House press release dated July 26

**President Eisenhower to President Kubitschek**

JULY 25, 1958

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to thank you for your letter of July twenty-third concerning a possible meeting of Chiefs of State on the present world crisis, and to express my appreciation for your initiative in conveying to me your opinion on this highly important matter.

I am particularly pleased to receive your support, Mr. President, for the principle that any such meeting be within the framework of the orderly processes of the United Nations. This, as you know, was a fundamental part of my reply to Chairman Khrushchev of July twenty-second.<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, I fully recognize the merit of Your Excellency's view with regard to Latin American participation in the consideration of world problems. A threat to peace anywhere in the world is of concern everywhere in the world. The Latin American Republics, representing such an important area of the world in terms of political and cultural significance as well as in population and material resources, should be and must be vitally concerned with the elimination of any such threat.

It is precisely in recognition of the responsibility which all parts of the world have for the maintenance of peace, and which all countries, large and small, must share, that the United Nations exists. In keeping with this concept, the

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Dulles attended a Ministerial meeting of the Baghdad Pact at London July 28-29 (see p. 272).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 11, 1958, p. 229.

United States believes the United Nations to be the only appropriate forum in which to discuss the Soviet charge of a present threat to peace in the Middle East and, as Your Excellency mentioned in your letter, Latin America is already represented on the Security Council of the United Nations.

You may be assured, Mr. President, of my continuing attention to the constructive opinions you have expressed in your letter, and of my best wishes for your personal well-being.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

Dr. JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK DE OLIVEIRA,  
*President of the United States of Brazil*

#### **President Kubitschek to President Eisenhower**

MR. PRESIDENT: Aware of the possibility of a forthcoming meeting of heads of Governments, with a view to seeking a solution for the present grave world crisis, I consider it opportune to emphasize the necessity of Latin America being represented at such a decisive gathering. It would be consistent and just, even indispensable, that the Latin American group—which not only comprises a population of almost two hundred million but is also representative of a particular civilization and culture—be present at a meeting from which decisions can spring that may put an end to the anguish which not only torments the countries more directly responsible for the destinies of the world, but is also being undergone by the whole of mankind.

In manifesting to Your Excellency this opinion calling for the presence of Latin America in the formulation of decisions to be taken, I am only being consistent with the reiterated statements which I have made public lately, to the effect that this substantial part of our Continent must be freed from the featureless rearguard position which it has held heretofore in the international scene, and that its voice be heeded whenever the destinies of the peoples are at stake. I feel sure that it will be beneficial to the cause of peace—which identifies one and all—if, in any kind of meeting, a new voice be heard which may add valid and constructive elements to the endeavor toward the achievement of a general understanding, supreme concern of mankind.

Thus, we would favor in principle a meeting of heads of Governments to be held within the Security Council of the United Nations, where Latin America already is represented. The motives and reasons which make the presence of Latin America imperative stand in full validity and strength even in the case that it be not found possible to hold the envisaged meeting within the framework of the United Nations.

I assure you, Mr. President, that I am not impelled nor inspired by intentions other than that of serving, to the

best of my abilities, the common objective of all peoples, that is, the final elimination of dangerous divergences which may lead the nations into a world-wide struggle, the consequences of which would this time be really unforeseeable.

May God inspire Your Excellency in this hour of extreme difficulty.

JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 23, 1958.

#### **U.S. Withdraws Marines Guarding Guantanamo Water Installation**

Press release 441 dated August 2

The detachment of U.S. Marines guarding the water installations of the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba was withdrawn on August 1. When advised that this action had been taken, the Government of Cuba informed our Ambassador [Earl E. T. Smith] that it would reassign guards to the installation without delay. The Cuban Government explained to the United States that the guard detail had been withdrawn while it was making a change of its forces in the region.

The Marines were detailed to guard the water installation, 4.5 miles from the base, on July 28. Rear Adm. Robert B. Ellis, commandant of the base, took this step after the commander of the Cuban Army forces in the area around Guantanamo notified the admiral that the Cuban Government was withdrawing forces assigned to protect the installation.

#### **U.S. Regrets Reported Involvement of Americans in Haitian Revolt**

Press release 439 dated July 31

U.S. Ambassador Gerald A. Drew has been instructed by the Department of State to inform the Government of Haiti that it deplores and regrets the reported involvement of American citizens in the revolutionary attempt which took place on July 29, 1958, against the legally constituted Government of President François Duvalier. Ambassador Drew is also requesting that the Government of Haiti furnish to the U.S. Government all available evidence which might be helpful to agencies of our Government which are conducting appropriate inquiries to ascertain if there has been any violation of U.S. laws.

## Visit of Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana

*Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, made an official visit to Washington July 23-26. Following are texts of a joint statement issued by the White House and the Ghana Information Service on July 26 and addresses made by Prime Minister Nkrumah before the Senate on July 24 and the House of Representatives on July 25, together with the exchange of greetings at the Washington National Airport and a list of the members of the official party.*

### JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated July 26

The visit to Washington of the Prime Minister of Ghana has afforded the opportunity for a full and friendly exchange of views between the Prime Minister and the President, the Secretary of State and other high Government officials. These conversations have had as their objective the further strengthening of the close ties of friendship and mutual respect which have characterized the relationship between the two countries since Ghana attained its independence last year.

The Prime Minister explained the importance that his government attaches to the Volta River project and also to the development plan which is being drawn up for the further economic and social development of Ghana. He hoped the Government of the United States would find it possible to assist the Government of Ghana with respect to both programs.

In subsequent conversations, representatives of the two governments explored the types and scope of assistance which the United States Government might be able to extend to the Government of Ghana. With regard to the Volta River project, the United States expressed its appreciation of the contribution this project could make to the

economic development of Ghana. It agreed to continue to explore with private American interests the aluminum manufacturing phase of the project and to consider how it might assist with loans if the required private financing were assured. The United States also expressed willingness to examine any proposals which the Government of Ghana might advance for the use of power from the Volta River for purposes other than the manufacture of aluminum. The two governments agreed that it would be desirable to bring up to date the engineering reports which were prepared in 1955 and to share the cost of this undertaking.

With respect to the new development plan now in the course of preparation, the Government of the United States indicated willingness to examine the plan with the Government of Ghana and to consider particular fields in which it might be able to cooperate through development loans. The United States Government further agreed to continue and expand its technical cooperation with the Government of Ghana through programs designed to aid in the gradual diversification and strengthening of the economy of that country.

The conversations included an exchange of views concerning the situation in the Middle East. The two governments were in agreement that the solution for the urgent problems of that area should be found within the framework of the United Nations in a manner which will preserve the independence and territorial integrity of all member nations, whether large or small. With respect to the particular situation in Lebanon, the United States emphasized its desire to withdraw its forces just as soon as the United Nations can act effectively to assure the independence and territorial integrity of that state. The Prime Minister noted that this position coincided with the views of his Government.

The representatives of the two governments emphasized their determination to work for the strengthening of the United Nations in the interests of establishment of world peace, prosperity and stability based upon international justice. It was apparent that both countries share the same beliefs with respect to mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, social and economic progress for all peoples, and the rights and dignity of the individual.

The two Governments also exchanged views on the emergence of new African states and the growing importance of the African continent in the realm of international affairs. The Prime Minister took the opportunity to explain the aspirations of the African states as they were expressed at the recent meeting of those nations at Accra and in his subsequent visits to each of the capitals of the states concerned. The President noted with deep interest the Prime Minister's explanations regarding the development of a distinctive African personality, emphasizing in this connection the sincere interest of the Government of the United States in the orderly political, economic and social advancement of the peoples of the African continent.

KWAME NKRUMAH

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### ADDRESS BEFORE THE SENATE<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, Honorable Senators, I wish to express my appreciation for your invitation to come here today. It is indeed a great honor to stand before a Senate whose deliberations have guided, and will continue to guide the destinies of the American Nation, and whose decisions affect people in every corner of the world.

I speak to you on behalf of the Government and people of Ghana—one of the youngest of nations, but one dedicated to those same ideals of liberty and justice which have always guided your own great country. I trust that my visit at the kind invitation of your great President, will strengthen the ties of friendship which already exist between your country and mine.

I have some appreciation of the weight of responsibility and the burden of work which presses

on the distinguished Members of this great Senate, and I therefore have no intention of talking to you at length. I simply wish to emphasize six basic points.

First. Like you, we believe profoundly in the right of all peoples to determine their own destinies. We are therefore opposed to all forms of colonialism—old and new—and we want to see all nations and their peoples genuinely independent and seeking a higher standard of life. In this respect we have a special concern for those of our fellow Africans whose countries are not yet independent.

Second. Like you, we seek a world of peace where men and women may bring up their children in tranquillity and security. Our foreign policy is one of nonalignment, but let no one misinterpret our position in matters affecting the independence of our own nation or the independence of others. I know that you will always find us alined with the forces fighting for freedom and peace.

Third. We give our full support to the United Nations and its Charter.

Fourth. We pray that your deliberations may succeed in achieving some relaxation in world tension and thus ease the vast burden of expenditure on armaments which weighs so heavily on this country and others. If that can be achieved, we hope that part of the resources thus saved could be used to banish poverty, disease, and illiteracy from the less fortunate parts of the world.

Fifth. I pay tribute to you and your people for the wonderful generosity which you have displayed over the last 13 years in assisting nations devastated by war, and the many other countries which have needed economic help. I am sure that this remarkable record will be enshrined in the history of the world for all time.

Sixth. I do not come to the United States asking for direct financial aid. We need American investment—both Government and private—but only for projects which can stand on their own feet and ultimately repay the original capital with reasonable interest.

I thank you, Mr. President, and Members of the Senate, for according me this honor. You can be assured of our enduring friendship and good will, and I am certain that the friendship which today

<sup>1</sup> *Congressional Record*, July 24, 1958, p. 13665.

exists between the United States and Ghana will endure so long as our two countries exist.

Again, I thank you, Mr. President.

#### **ADDRESS BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES<sup>2</sup>**

Mr. Speaker, honorable Members of the House of Representatives, I greatly appreciate the honor you have done me in inviting me to speak to you today. I represent a very young country, but for centuries we have had ties of kinship and close associations with your own great nation. I come here to reaffirm our friendship and good will.

Yesterday I was privileged to address the distinguished Members of your Senate. I tried to be brief for I know the pressure of work on Congress now and I will not take up much of your time today. Apart from the business before you, I am well aware, as a fellow politician, of the keen desire of some of your members to attend to other matters which will affect their political fortunes next November.

Basically we seek the same fundamental objectives—those of peace, respect for the sovereignty of other nations, and for the rights of the individual. There is no need for me to talk to you about those fundamental truths which are enshrined in the history of this great Congress.

We are a small nation, but we occupy an unusual position as a member both of the United Nations and the commonwealth, as well as having active and direct links with the other several independent states of the African continent: Ethiopia, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Liberia. As such, so it seems to me, we can contribute most to the attainment of those fundamental objectives in other parts of the world by setting a good example ourselves.

In our foreign relations, our policy is that of positive neutralism and nonalignment. This does not mean negative neutralism and should not be confused with the sort of neutralism which implies the suspension of judgment, but rather the conscientious exercise of it. Our foreign policy is one of friendly relations with all nations and

unswerving loyalty to the charter of the United Nations as well as respect for its decisions.

In domestic policy, we have taken strong measures to preserve our internal security. Understandably, we have been criticized for this in some quarters, but I am convinced that what we have done will do most to protect our democracy and the liberty of the individual. Tragically, there are all too many examples in the world today of small countries whose independence and very existence are threatened because their governments have failed to take adequate security measures.

It is the policy of my government to endeavor to banish poverty, illiteracy, and disease from our country. Already we have done much from our own resources, but far more must be done if we are to achieve that sustained economic development which will let us give our people a reasonable standard of living.

I am sure that you will be relieved to know that I have not come to the United States asking for direct financial aid. We need American investment—both government and private—but only for projects which can stand on their feet and ultimately repay the original capital with reasonable interest.

Mr. Speaker, I thank you for this great honor. On behalf of my fellow countrymen, I extend to you, to the Members of this House, and to the American people, our friendship, and our good will.

Thank you.

#### **EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS<sup>3</sup>**

##### **Vice President Nixon:**

Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, and ladies and gentlemen: It is a very great honor for me to represent the President of the United States and the American people as we welcome you to Washington, D.C. And in welcoming you I have memories of a visit to your country just a little over a year ago. It was a great event. It was the birth of a nation—the birth of a nation in which you played such an important and decisive part. And, as you come to

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 25, 1958, p. 13882.

<sup>3</sup> Made at the Washington National Airport on July 23 (press release 418).

the United States, you are going to find among our people every place that you visit tremendous interest, both in you individually and also in your country.

This interest will exist because yours is a new nation that has entered into a period now of self-government and independence, just as our own country went through this same process many years ago. There will be interest also because this has occurred in the heart of Africa and it is an indication of a great trend that is developing in that part of the world in this exciting new continent.

There will be a special interest in you in the United States for another reason which I would like to mention. We feel that we, at least, have a part of you in our country—at least in spirit. We are proud of the fact that you studied in the United States and that here you had the opportunity to know us through the students from this country with whom you came in contact at that time.

So, Mr. Prime Minister, may I say you will find every place you go I am sure the warmest and the most friendly welcome. You will find esteem for yourself, you will find affection for your people, and the best wishes for your country in the years ahead.

#### **Prime Minister Nkrumah:**

Mr. Vice President, I am most grateful to you for your kind words of welcome. I truly appreciate the gracious invitation from President Eisenhower which has brought me here today, and I bring greetings from the Government and people of Ghana to the Government and people of the United States of America.

We were delighted, sir, to welcome you to Ghana during our independence ceremonies. It gives me equally great pleasure today to renew my friendship with you. I have, of course, in addition, personal and sentimental reasons for being so happy to return to this country. My visit here is a manifestation of the warm feeling of friendship that exists between the United States of America and Ghana and between our respective countrymen. We remember with gratitude the encouragement we have received from

your Government in our first efforts to consolidate our independence. We are anxious to retain your friendliness and good will.

I have arrived here, Mr. Vice President, at a time of great international tension. I represent only one African state, but we are in the unique position of being a member both of the United Nations and of the Commonwealth, as well as having active and direct links with the seven other independent African states. We also have a direct interest in the Middle Eastern situation. I sincerely hope that it will be possible to reach agreement to hold a very early meeting within the framework of the United Nations of the heads of government of those states best able to contribute to a solution.

I look forward to having fruitful discussions with your leaders. I hope that these discussions will result in greater understanding of our respective problems and policies and that they will contribute to the store of human good will and world peace. I thank you again, Mr. Vice President.

#### **MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY**

*The Department of State announced on July 15 (press release 405) that the following would accompany Prime Minister Nkrumah as members of the official party:<sup>4</sup>*

- D. A. Chapman, Ambassador of Ghana
- Mrs. Chapman
- Kojo Botsio, M.P., Minister of Trade and Industries
- Mrs. Botsio
- Kofi Baako, M.P., Minister of Information and Broadcasting
- A. L. Adu, O.B.E., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense and External Affairs
- Enoch Okoh, Acting Secretary to the Cabinet
- Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United States
- Clement E. Conger, Deputy Chief of Protocol, Department of State
- C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Director, Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs, Department of State
- Stuart P. Lilllico, Press Officer, Department of State

<sup>4</sup> Prime Minister Nkrumah left Washington on July 26 for a tour to include Harrisburg, Hershey, and Philadelphia, Pa.; New York, N.Y.; and Chicago, Ill. He will leave New York for London on Aug. 2.

## Visit of Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani of Italy

*Amintore Fanfani, President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic, made an informal visit to Washington July 28-31. Following is the text of a joint statement of President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister released by the White House on July 30, together with the text of an address made by the Prime Minister before the Senate on July 29.*

### JOINT STATEMENT

White House press release dated July 30

The President of the United States, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic, who is also Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary of State of the United States have concluded two days of discussion on a wide range of topics of mutual interest to their two countries. Other governmental representatives on both sides took part in particular phases of the discussions. In an atmosphere of friendship and understanding they examined the present world situation, including the Middle East and the problems surrounding a possible meeting of Heads of Government within the framework of the United Nations.

The President, the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister exchanged views on the recent developments in the Middle East and found themselves in satisfactory accord. They also agreed on the importance of the position of Italy with respect to its interests in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, and hence on the importance of insuring means whereby Italy's views may be taken into account on a continuing basis. They arranged to remain in close contact.

The President and the Italian Prime Minister reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the North Atlantic Alliance and to the United Nations established to defend the peace and to pro-

tect the right of peoples to live in freedom under governments of their own choosing. They reiterated their firm conviction that the combined strength and coordinated action of the free and independent countries of the North Atlantic Alliance are vital to their peace and security, and will remain a cornerstone of their foreign policies.

The President and the Secretary of State expressed full recognition of the contribution being made by Italy in the development of closer political and economic association between the countries of Europe for the purpose of improving the well-being of their peoples.

The Prime Minister outlined the program he proposes with regard to his country's economic problems, including foreign trade. The representatives of the United States expressed their appreciation and their confidence that increased economic ties between the United States and Italy might contribute favorably to this program.

In conclusion the President expressed his gratification with the Prime Minister's visit to Washington and for the opportunity thus provided for a friendly and constructive exchange of views. The Prime Minister in turn voiced his satisfaction at being able, following the assumption of his high offices, to renew his acquaintance with the President and the Secretary of State.

AMINTORE FANFANI  
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

### ADDRESS BEFORE THE SENATE<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President, distinguished Senators, with deep feeling I have crossed the threshold of the

<sup>1</sup> Congressional Record, July 29, 1958, p. 14046. For text of a similar address made by the Prime Minister before the House of Representatives on the same day, see *ibid.*, p. 14122.

Hall in which your assembly sits and works. Highly resplendent here is the light of the great tradition of freedom of the American people.

The echo of the deeply moved voice of two great Italians still resounds among these walls.

Twice already in the last 10 years two very authoritative voices have expressed our anxieties, our problems, our purposes.

On September 24, 1951, Alcide de Gasperi, as head of the Italian Government, was asking your assistance, keeping in mind that the Italian nation is working hard and needs working opportunities above all.

On February 29, 1956, Giovanni Gronchi, as President of our Republic, witnessing to the fact that the balance of the first 10 years after the liberation had been a favorable one, and he asked the Congress to tell the American people that the help given Italy had not been wasted.

These precious testimonials and exhortations can only be confirmed now.

Since the time when those words were pronounced here in Washington 2 years ago, Italy has made further progress in all fields. She has consolidated her economy. She has better balanced her state budget. She has bettered the living conditions of her people. Consequently, after 10 years of hard government action, in recent elections the support given to Alcide de Gasperi's party has grown, while for the first time since 1946 the number of Communist deputies has decreased.

The whole Nation has acquired a firmer confidence in her future.

This greater confidence has resulted in the greater attention with which our people follow the development of international life, anxious to bring, by their ideas and their action, a pacifying contribution to their tumultuous course.

In this appearance of Italy on the horizon of great international life, no one should see symptoms of restlessness or of slightly lessened solidarity.

If anything, there is further proof that the common action of all the allies, and in the first place the generous solidarity of the United States of America for the rebirth and reconstruction of Italy, have scored a full success. So much so that, now that we have overcome the most acute anxieties of our gravest internal problems, we intend to reciprocate, as we now can do, the allies'

aid. Cooperating in our turn to solve the problems besetting the world and the Atlantic community of which we are a part.

Your assistance in stabilizing the life of our democracy has placed us in a position to contribute to the stabilization of life in the great family of the free people, integrated by the nations who are aiming at a more secure freedom.

This cooperation Italy intends to give, within the limits of her power, within the framework of her alliances, with the certainty that we contribute to averting from other areas of the world that danger of Communist subversion which has been averted in our land.

There has been much talk of Italian plans and programs to consolidate peace in the world, especially threatened today by the restlessness and the aspirations of the people of the Middle East.

It is not up to a country which does not possess all the means to uphold them, to formulate and propose plans, in the strict sense of the word.

We are a people living close to the danger area, possessing a knowledge of it that goes back into the millennia, and we are in a position to talk to the populations which inhabit them without arousing suspicion because, long since, we have no possessions to defend or to extend. It is the duty of such a people to make their allies aware of their anxieties, their experience, their own suggestions. Whether these concern the contingent aspects of the situation or the permanent ones; whether they consider the manner by which the temporary guaranties required of the friends of the threatened people can be substituted by other guaranties; whether they concern the orderly peaceful political evolution or the necessary economic assistance to those territories as a whole: of one thing we can be certain, namely, that such suggestions will only be aimed at stimulating and contributing to the solution of problems that are already on the table. And by our ideas and suggestions, we pledge ourselves to contribute our action and our endeavors to the peaceful widening of the area of freedom and prosperity in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The high ideal values we have in common, the close pledges we have given with our allies, the identical danger threatening our way of life: these are the safest guaranties that Italy is firmly on the side of freedom, and that it works and intends to work for peace in security.

We Italians are convinced that this common work, organically articulated in common action, will increase the concreteness and effectiveness of the allied effort, drawing toward it new friendly feelings of people now being tempted by the solidarity toward other communities that love peace and progress only in appearance, for they are the enemies of freedom.

We Italians are also certain that by such actions we shall make more intimate and cordial the already intimate and cordial collaboration of our country with the United States of America.

Mr. President, Honorable Representatives, the meetings in which I have the honor of participating now in Washington will produce other positive results in terms of the friendship between the United States and Italy, and for the future development of action of the free peoples of the West. You can rely on that.

The frank exchange of opinion will reinvigorate our mutual collaboration. And this will continue to be the cornerstone of that edifice of civilization to which we are dedicated, in the service of our peoples, for peace in the world in the observance of that justice which God requires of men.

## **U.K. To Lift Import Restrictions on Chemicals and Allied Products**

Press release 429 dated July 29

The United Kingdom Government announced on July 29 that from August 18, 1958, U.K. import licensing restrictions will be removed from a wide range of chemicals and allied products imported from the dollar area. A detailed announcement was made in London indicating the commodities covered. With a few exceptions all chemicals and allied products (including plastics materials) of a kind used industrially are to be freed, but dyestuffs and intermediates and products used primarily as consumer goods (e. g. pharmaceuticals, paints, photographic goods, toilet preparations, and goods in retail packs) will continue under restrictions. The broad effect will be that with certain exceptions, such as dyestuffs and intermediates, import licenses will no longer be required for most chemicals used as industrial materials.

Users in the United Kingdom will benefit from the greater freedom in choice of supply which will result from this decision, and American exporters will have increased opportunities of access to the British domestic market. The Government of the United Kingdom has indicated that with the improvement in its balance-of-payments position it has been possible to take this further step in the removal of discriminatory restrictions against imports from Canada, the United States, and other dollar countries.

The United States welcomes this step toward freer international trade, which is in accord with the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in harmony with overall U.S. efforts to obtain the elimination of unnecessary trade restrictions.

## **U.S.-U.S.S.R. Film Exchanges**

### **Resumption of Negotiations**

Press release 432 dated July 30

The Department of State announced on July 30 that Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, and Turner B. Shelton, director of the U.S. Information Agency motion picture service, will resume negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union for the purchase and sale of motion pictures under the cultural, technical, and educational exchange agreement signed last January.<sup>1</sup>

The negotiations at Washington were temporarily recessed last April<sup>2</sup> and, at the invitation of the Soviet Union, are being resumed at Moscow September 8. The negotiations are in furtherance of arrangements for the sale and purchase of films by the industries of both countries and the discussions of the carrying out of the other provisions under the motion-picture section of the agreement.

### **Reports to American Film Industry**

Press release 434 dated July 31

Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, and Turner B. Shelton,

<sup>1</sup> For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 830.

director of the motion picture service of the U.S. Information Agency, reported yesterday to the board of the Motion Picture Export Association on the current status of the exchange of motion pictures between the United States and the Soviet Union under the cultural, technical, and educational exchange agreement.

On August 21 Mr. Johnston and Mr. Shelton will meet with representatives of American film companies not affiliated with the Motion Picture Association or the Motion Picture Export Association for the purpose of briefing these companies on the status of the exchange. Both Mr. Johnston and Mr. Shelton expressed the hope that representatives of all the producers and distributors not affiliated with the MPAA and MPEA would attend this meeting, scheduled to be held at Washington in the Department of State Building.

### **Malaya Receives U.S. Loan for Seaport Improvement**

Press release 433 dated July 30

In response to a request from the Government of the Federation of Malaya, the United States has agreed to lend Malaya \$10 million to assist in developing increased international seaport facilities in the North Klang Straits area on the west coast of Malaya near the capital city of Kuala Lumpur. The loan was made from the U.S. Development Loan Fund and provides for repayment in U.S. currency at 3½ percent interest over a period of 30 years.

The new seaport when completed will provide the Federation with three additional deep sea berths and auxiliary facilities near Port Swettenham to handle increases in the volume of traffic and the growth of the Malayan economy.

During the last few years there has been a change in the character of the trade of the Federation of Malaya through this port. This change will be accelerated now that the Federation has become an independent modern state. Bulk commodities, such as rice, flour, and sugar, which formed the main items 20 years ago, now constitute only one-quarter of all imports, the proportion of general merchandise cargo having increased substantially. This, together with the development of the Federation's export trade in

bulk latex and palm oil, scrap iron, and ilmenite ore, has altered the Federation's wharfage requirements. The planned facilities at the North Klang Straits site will help solve the problems raised by these changes.

### **33,000,000 Pounds of DDT Shipped Overseas in Malaria Program**

The Department of State announced on July 21 (press release 414) that during the first 6 months of 1958 more than 33 million pounds of DDT have been bought from U.S. industry with ICA funds and shipped overseas for use in the worldwide malaria eradication program. The purchase of DDT, along with other necessary supplies and equipment, by the U.S. Government represents a substantial part of the global drive to eradicate malaria.

The United States works with other nations in many ways to wipe out this disease. With 27 countries, the United States works directly through government-to-government programs. To these nations the International Cooperation Administration has sent, in addition to DDT and other supplies, 30 American technicians who work with officials of the host government to set up effective malaria eradication programs. Of these 27 nations, 7 are in the Far East (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Viet-Nam); 7 are in the Near East and South Asia (Ceylon, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan); 3 are in Africa (Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya); and 10 in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay).

In addition the U.S. Government gave \$5 million to the World Health Organization and \$2 million to the Pan American Sanitary Organization this year to assist in carrying out the malaria eradication program during its first year of operation.

More than 60 nations are working together in the second year of a 5-year program of eradication. The success of the worldwide campaign depends on two major factors related to the United States. These are: (a) the ability and capacity of the U.S. chemical industry to turn out DDT in large amounts; and (b) the willingness of the U.S. Government to use some of its resources

to finance the purchase of millions of pounds of the insecticide for use in the worldwide malaria eradication program.

The 5-year program to eliminate malaria is based not only upon a long series of studies on the feasibility of eradication but also upon the experience of successful eradication of the disease in the United States and several other countries.

## **State Department Celebrates 20th Year of U.S. Cultural Relations Program**

Press release 426 dated July 28

The Department of State on July 28 opened to the public an exhibit marking the 20th anniversary of the inauguration of its program of international cultural relations.<sup>1</sup> It was 20 years ago, on July 28, 1938, that the then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, established in the Department a division for the purpose of "encouraging and strengthening cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other countries." The first activity of the Division of Cultural Relations, as it was called, was the initiation of the program of student exchanges proposed by the U.S. Government at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936.

Included in the Departmental order were other activities for which the new division was given responsibility. These included cooperation in the field of music, art, literature, and other intellectual and cultural attainments; encouragement of a closer relationship between unofficial organizations of the United States and foreign governments engaged in cultural and intellectual activities; and generally the improvement and broadening of the scope of this country's cultural relations with other countries.

Out of these early beginnings have grown the Department's present international educational exchange program and the President's special international program for cultural presentations, which it also carries out.

More than 50,000 persons have participated in the exchange program, and its geographic scope

<sup>1</sup> For an article entitled "Twenty Years After: Two Decades of Government-Sponsored Cultural Relations" by Francis J. Colligan, see BULLETIN of July 21, 1958, p. 112.

has been extended from the American Republics to over 80 countries in all parts of the world. These persons have been exchanged not only for purposes of study but also to teach, conduct advanced research, lecture, observe, and to render consultative services. The cultural presentations program provides assistance to American cultural and athletic groups to tour abroad "to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the cultural interests, developments and achievements of the people of the United States." Some 120 cultural and sports attractions, such as major symphony orchestras and swimming teams, have been presented in over 500 cities abroad.

The Department also is responsible for official participation in education, scientific, and cultural relations projects carried out multilaterally through United States membership in international organizations.

Principal legislative authority under which these programs are currently conducted is derived from the Fulbright Act, the Smith-Mundt Act, and the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956 (the Humphrey-Thompson Act). Both the educational exchange and the cultural presentations programs have the common basic objective of furthering international understanding.

## **International Travel Policy Committee Formed**

The Department of Commerce announced on July 25 the establishment of an Interdepartmental Travel Policy Committee to promote development of international travel to and from the United States. Recommended by the Randall report on international travel submitted by President Eisenhower to the Congress on May 12,<sup>1</sup> the new committee is composed of top-level representatives from 10 U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Activities of the committee will fall within the following general spheres of operation affecting both the individual traveler and the travel industry: elimination and simplification of entry and sojourn requirements; stimulation of low-cost

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 381, 85th Cong., 2d sess.

and group travel; development of travel statistics for market research; improvements in the travel plant; and, in cooperation with private industry, exploration of measures to expand travel to and from the United States.

Chaired by Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs Henry Kearns, the permanent secretariat of the committee is located in the Office of International Travel of the Department's Bureau of Foreign Commerce.

### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

## Provisional Agenda of Thirteenth General Assembly <sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. A/3846 dated July 18

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of New Zealand.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [resolution 1145 (XII) of 14 November 1957].
15. Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of three members of the Trusteeship Council.
18. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
19. Appointment of members of the Disarmament Commission.
20. Election of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [resolution 1165 (XII) of 26 November 1957].

<sup>1</sup> To convene at U.N. Headquarters, N.Y., on Sept. 16, 1958.

(b) Progress report of the Administrator for Residential Affairs of the Agency [resolution 1159 (XII) of 26 November 1957].

28. Economic development of under-developed countries:

- (a) Establishment of the Special Fund: reports of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Fund and of the Economic and Social Council [resolution 1219 (XII) of 14 December 1957];
- (b) International tax problems: report of the Economic and Social Council [resolution 1032 (XI) of 26 February 1957].

29. Programmes of technical assistance:

- (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council;
- (b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [resolution 831 (IX) of 26 November 1954].

30. Question of assistance to Libya [resolution 924 (X) of 9 December 1955].

31. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [resolutions 428 (V) of 14 December 1950 and 1166 (XII) of 26 November 1957].

32. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [decision of the General Assembly of 11 December 1957].

33. Recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples and nations to self-determination [resolution 1188 (XII) of 11 December 1957].

34. Advisory services in the field of human rights: report of the Economic and Social Council [resolution 926 (X) of 14 December 1955].

35. Freedom of information:

- (a) Report of the Secretary-General on consultations concerning the draft Convention on Freedom of Information [resolution 1189 A (XII) of 11 December 1957];
- (b) Reports of the Economic and Social Council and of the Commission on Human Rights [resolution 1189 B (XII) of 11 December 1957].

36. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

- (a) Information on social conditions;
- (b) Information on other conditions;
- (c) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information;
- (d) Methods of reproducing summaries of information concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General;
- (e) Report of the Secretary-General on developments connected with the association of Non-Self-Governing Territories with the European Economic Community [resolution 1153 (XII) of 26 November 1957];
- (f) Offers of study and training facilities under resolution 845 (IX) of 22 November 1954; report of the Secretary-General [resolutions 931 (X) of 8 November 1955 and 1154 (XII) of 26 November 1957].

37. Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

38. Election, if required, to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

39. Question of South West Africa:

- (a) Report of the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa [resolution 1143 (XII) of 25 October 1957];
- (b) Report of the Committee on South West Africa [resolutions 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953 and 1142 B (XII) of 25 October 1957];
- (c) Study of legal action to ensure fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the Mandatory Power under the Mandate for South West Africa: resumed consideration of the special report of the Committee on South West Africa [resolutions 1060 (XI) of 26 February 1957 and 1142 A (XII) of 25 October 1957];
- (d) Election of three members of the Committee on South West Africa [resolution 1061 (XI) of 26 February 1957].

40. The future of Togoland under French administration: report of the United Nations Commissioner for the Supervision of the Elections and report of the Trusteeship Council thereon [resolution 1182 (XII) of 29 November 1957].

41. Question of the frontier between the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration and Ethiopia: reports of the Governments of Ethiopia and of Italy [resolution 1213 (XII) of 14 December 1957].

42. Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

- (a) United Nations (for the financial year ended 31 December 1957);
- (b) United Nations Children's Fund (for the financial year ended 31 December 1957);
- (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (for the financial period ended 31 December 1957);
- (d) United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (for the financial year ended 30 June 1958);
- (e) United Nations Refugee Fund (for the financial year ended 31 December 1957).

43. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1958.

44. Budget estimates for the financial year 1959.

45. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

- (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
- (b) Committee on Contributions;
- (c) Board of Auditors;
- (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointment made by the Secretary-General;

- (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
- (f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
- 46. Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds [resolution 1197 B (XII) of 13 December 1957].
- 47. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
- 48. United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund: annual report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
- 49. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies of technical assistance funds allocated from the Special Account [resolution 519 A (VI) of 12 January 1952].
- 50. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination between the United Nations and the specialized agencies: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
- 51. Control and limitation of documentation [resolution 1203 (XII) of 13 December 1957]:
  - (a) Report of the Committee on the Control and Limitation of Documentation;
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
- 52. Offer by the Government of Chile of land in Santiago to be used as office site for the United Nations and other international organizations: report of the Secretary-General and observations thereon by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [resolution 1224 (XII) of 14 December 1957].
- 53. Personnel questions:
  - (a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1226 (XII) of 14 December 1957];
  - (b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
  - (c) Pensionable remuneration of the staff [resolution 1095 A (XI) of 27 February 1957];
  - (d) Other personnel questions.
- 54. United Nations International School and delegation office facilities: reports of the Secretary-General [resolutions 1228 A (XII) and 1228 B (XII) of 14 December 1957].
- 55. Public information activities of the United Nations: report of the Committee of Experts on United Nations Public Information and comments and recommendations thereon by the Secretary-General [resolution 1177 (XII) of 26 November 1957].
- 56. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its tenth session.
- 57. Question of arbitral procedure [resolution 989 (X) of 14 December 1955].
- 58. Question of initiating a study of the juridical régime of historic waters, including historic bays [item proposed by the Secretary-General].
- 59. Question of convening a second United Nations conference on the law of the sea [item proposed by the Secretary-General].
- 60. The banning of the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign bases on the territories of other countries and international co-operation in the study of cosmic space [item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics].
- 61. Measures aimed at implementation and promotion of principles of peaceful co-existence among States [item proposed by Czechoslovakia].
- 62. Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa [item proposed by India and Pakistan]:
  - (a) Report of the Government of India;
  - (b) Report of the Government of Pakistan.
- 63. Question of the representation of China in the United Nations [item proposed by India].
- 64. The question of Antarctica [item proposed by India].
- 65. The question of Algeria [item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and Yemen].
- 66. Question of disarmament [item proposed by the Secretary-General].
- 67. United Nations Emergency Force [item proposed by the Secretary-General]:
  - (a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force;
  - (b) Progress report on the Force;
  - (c) Summary study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force.
- 68. Report of the Secretary-General on the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy [item proposed by the Secretary-General].

## **Confirmation of Delegates to Thirteenth General Assembly**

The Senate on July 30 confirmed the following-named persons to be representatives of the United States to the 13th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1958:

Henry Cabot Lodge  
 Michael J. Mansfield  
 Bourke B. Hickenlooper  
 Herman Phleger  
 George McGregor Harrison

The following were confirmed to be alternate U.S. representatives for the same period:

James J. Wadsworth  
 Miss Marian Anderson  
 Watson W. Wise  
 Mrs. Oswald B. Lord  
 Irving Salomon

## **U.S. Endorses New Report on Hungary by U.N. Special Committee**

Press release 412 dated July 17

The unanimous report of the U.N. Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, which was released on July 16,<sup>1</sup> deserves the widest interest and attention throughout the world. This new report deals with recent events in Hungary, particularly the brutal executions of former Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter, and two of their associates.<sup>2</sup> It adds further incontrovertible evidence to the long record of broken promises of the Kadar regime in Hungary and of the callous disregard of both that regime and the Soviet Government for the rights of the Hungarian people. The report makes it abundantly clear that the Hungarian regime, which was forcibly imposed by the Soviet Government in November 1956 and has since been supported by the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, secretly tried and executed Imre Nagy and his associates in flagrant violation of assurances of safe conduct and of recognized conditions of immunity.

The report also recalls assurances publicly stated by Kadar that no punitive proceedings would be taken against Imre Nagy by the Hungarian regime, as well as the declaration made by the Rumanian Foreign Minister in December 1956 before the U.N. General Assembly that Nagy and his associates, after removal to Rumania, would be assured hospitality and personal safety in accordance with international rules of political asylum. Significantly, the Soviet Government and the Kadar regime made the announcement of the execution of Imre Nagy and his compatriots almost simultaneously.

Moreover, in spite of repeated public assurances by Hungarian authorities that proceedings against persons who participated in the 1956 national uprising were virtually over and that no further reprisals would take place, the Special Committee has evidence that at least 33 such individuals were sentenced to death during the past

year and that others, not as well known as Nagy and Maleter, may shortly share their fate.

The Committee also calls attention to the fact that the Soviet and Hungarian Governments have continued to persist in their refusal to comply with resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and to cooperate in any way with the Committee. It notes that these Governments, as well as the Rumanian Government, have refused to accept letters addressed by the Special Committee to the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Rumania asking for specific information on the arrest, trial, and execution of Nagy, Maleter, and their companions. The Committee in its report again calls upon the Hungarian authorities to desist from carrying out further death sentences and to cease its repressive measures against the Hungarian people.

The U.S. Government is convinced that the nations of the world, feeling a deep sense of shock and revulsion at the events in Hungary, will not assume an attitude of indifference permitting the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to escape the full weight of the opprobrium that they must justly bear because of their actions. The U.S. Government believes that the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary has once again rendered a signal service to the United Nations and to the world. The Committee's report on the recent developments in Hungary is clear and conclusive despite the willful refusal of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to accede to the Committee's request for full information about these events. The U.S. Government welcomes and endorses the Committee's report.

The situation of the Hungarian people demands the continued sympathy and close attention of all peoples and governments throughout the world who believe in the principles of justice, human freedom, and national independence. The United States, on its part, will continue to exert every possible effort to keep the plight of the Hungarian people before the conscience of the world and will continue to give full support to all measures within the United Nations that may contribute to the alleviation of the suffering and repression which the Hungarian people now endure.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/3849. For an excerpt from a previous report submitted by the Special Committee on June 12, 1957, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1957, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 581, and July 7, 1958, p. 7.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### France Delivers Notice of Intent To Terminate Air Agreement

Press release 419 dated July 24

Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador to the United States, on July 24 delivered to Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, a notice of intent to terminate the Civil Air Transport Services Agreement concluded with the United States in 1946.<sup>1</sup>

For some time France has felt that the 1946 agreement is not adapted to the present conditions of air traffic between France and the United States. In accordance with the provisions of the agreement, although not sharing the view of the French Government, the United States some months ago agreed to discuss the problems which the French Government had raised.

Those discussions have terminated without a mutually satisfactory understanding between the two Governments. The French Government, therefore, has invoked its privilege under article XIII of the agreement to notify the United States of France's desire to terminate the agreement. Article XIII provides for the termination of the agreement 1 year after the date of notification.

Mr. Dillon expressed regret at the French decision. The French Ambassador pointed out to the Under Secretary that the decision to denounce the agreement of 1946 was by no means an unfriendly gesture and was adopted by the French authorities solely on the basis of commercial considerations.

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and interna-

<sup>1</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1679.

tional staff. Done at Ottawa September 20, 1951. Entered into force May 18, 1954. TIAS 2992.  
*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, July 25, 1958.

#### Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Republic of China, July 1, 1958.

#### Trade and Commerce

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

*Declarations deposited recognizing signatures as fully binding:* Luxembourg, May 20, 1958; Belgium, May 21, 1958.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Declarations deposited recognizing signatures as fully binding:* Luxembourg, May 20, 1958; Belgium, May 21, 1958.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Declarations deposited recognizing signatures as fully binding:* Luxembourg, May 20, 1958; Belgium, May 21, 1958.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955. Entered into force October 24, 1956. TIAS 3677.

*Declarations deposited recognizing signatures as fully binding:* Luxembourg, May 20, 1958; Belgium, May 21, 1958.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Declarations deposited recognizing signatures as fully binding:* Luxembourg, May 20, 1958; Belgium, May 21, 1958.

#### United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

*Signature:* Federation of Malaya, June 16, 1958.

*Acceptance deposited:* Federation of Malaya, June 16, 1958.

#### BILATERAL

##### Finland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of May 6, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3248, 3488, 3533, 3534, 3568, and 3673), and May 10, 1957 (TIAS 3826). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Washington February 10 and 17, 1958. Entered into force February 17, 1958.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Partially in force, section B of the procès verbal having entered into force on October 7, 1957, as a result of the entry into force on that date of the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the general agreement.

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Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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| 433  | 7/30 | Loan to Malaya for seaport improvement.                           |
| 434  | 7/31 | Reports to U.S. industry on film exchanges with U.S.S.R.          |
| *435 | 7/31 | Delegation to 13th U.N. General Assembly (biographic details).    |
| 436  | 7/31 | Note to U.S.S.R. on prevention of surprise attack.                |
| †437 | 7/31 | Secretary Dulles to visit Brazil.                                 |
| 438  | 7/31 | Dulles: news conference.  |
| 439  | 7/31 | U.S. regrets reported involvement of Americans in Haitian revolt. |
| 440  | 8/2  | Recognition of Iraqi Republic.                                    |
| 441  | 8/2  | U.S. withdraws Marines from Guantanamo water installations.       |
| †442 | 8/3  | U.S.-Turkey statement on financial discussions.                   |
| †443 | 8/3  | Dulles: departure statement.                                      |

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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